History (and related interesting facts)

The Soviet defenses that were "destroyed" (abandoned would be a better word) were ones deeper inside the Union and as I have pointed out twice already, this was so that the men, weapons and supplies could be moved forward to the new forts being built along the border (the Molotov Line). The general incompetence of many people in the Soviet Union (again, the purges were a major impact), combined with major differences of opinions among high level members of the military lead this process to be incomplete at the time of Barbarossa (incidentally, if Stalin was planning to invade, why would he be construction new defensive positions along the border, eh?) - and to add to the confusion parts of the Stalin line were being redeveloped and enhanced at the same time.

The Mark 3 Panzer was a solid vehicle, and the Mark 4 was an excellent one, and probably the best tank the Nazi's produced (everything afterwards was over-engineered crap that didn't fulfill their actual needs). I dunno why you keep going on about T-34s and KV-1s - the bulk of the Soviet tank forces weren't those designs (indeed, if they are such an important factor, then surely Stalin would've been much better waiting another couple of years until the Red Army was completely equipped with them....), and both suffered from significant flaws anyway (it wasn't until the -85 upgrade that the T-34 really became a great tank, and the KV-1 never became one).

The BT-7 on the other hand was fast but of limited use in combat by 1941. As for the line about it being designed for the autobahns, the basic design dates from 1932 (there were some upgrades from this, such as the engine, but the underlying design remained the same), so I dunno where you got that idea from. Being fast and having a long range is ideal for use in places like, say, most of the absolutely huge Soviet Union. And of course, they were being withdrawn from service in 1941 - the time when you claim this invasion they were meant for was going to happen.

Stalin placed loads of men and support for them near the border as a bluff. Such deceptions were pretty much standard Soviet policy continuing long after Stalin (they would do it a lot with bombers and later missiles to exaggerate their nuclear capabilities during the cold war). They weren't in either good defensive or good offensive positions (in part due to Stalin's lack of understanding of good deployment). Any attempt to actually launch an attack as they were would've been about as successful as their defense. Not to mention as a portion of the overall strength of the Red Army, those moved to the border was relatively small and often lacking enough supplies to defend let alone actually launch an attack.

And, I'll ask again, why '41? It's pretty much the worst time for the Soviets to invade. Their army is a mess due to the impact of the purges and subsequent reorganisations, they're in the middle of massive upgrading of equipment (such as the aforementioned tanks) and while their economy is strengthening it's still somewhat fragile. Meanwhile the Nazi's are at their peak with nothing threatening them to the west. Pick any other year between 1933 and 1945 and the Soviets would be in a better position for war. So why '41? Stalin was a careful opportunist, not a gambler. It simply doesn't make sense that he would try to attack at that time. Stalin's actual behaviour in the first half of '41 likewise isn't consistent with planning an immediate offense - he was regularly talking about how Germany wouldn't attack (even after the attack had begun). Surely if he was planning an invasion he would be building Germany up as a threat so as to justify his actions?

The effect of the various partisan movements has been greatly exaggerated *With a few notable exceptions* largely as a salve to national pride.

John Keegan covered it rather well in his book on the war.

The BT-7 was indeed operated throughout the war (hell, I actually pointed that out in the post you're quoting...) but from the sources I've seen (including [as much as I hate it] Wikipedia: "The BT-7 [note 1] was the last of the BT series of Soviet cavalry tanks that were produced in large numbers between 1935 and 1940") significant production had stopped before '41. By the time of Barbarossa, the Soviets had begun withdrawing it from their main Western units, knowing full well it was obselete, replacing it with T-34s. They hadn't finished doing do certainly, with thousands of the old tanks still close to the border - which incidentally is another hit against the idea that the Red Army was prepared to attack in '41. As is the fact that, as you say, many of the tanks were immobilised through lack of maintenance. Surely, if they were prepared to attack, they would have their inventory of their "main battle tank" that was supposedly perfect for invading Germany, in good working condition?



How is declaring war when you are at your weakest and your opponents at their strongest not a massive gamble? There was no immediate need for the Soviets to attack in '41. The situations are likely (not certain, but likely) to favour them the longer they wait. Going all in in '41 is utterly out of character for Stalin. He didn't need a surprise attack, he needed time. Time to finish reconstructing and reorganising the Red Army. Time to get his new defenses completed. Time to get his new designs of vehicles and aircraft fully into service. And he though he had that time. He didn't think Hitler was going to attack when he did. So why would he rush in in '41?

Yeah, it's hard to hide the forces on the border. Which was the entire point. They weren't hiding. Why would you put large amounts of undersupplied troops at the border? Why would you have thousands of obsolete tanks sitting around near the front? Why would you be so obvious with your deployments? And why would you make said deployments utterly unsuited to either attack or defense? The only remotely sane answer is that you want them to be seen. You want to look strong. You want to discourage your likely enemies from attacking to buy yourself time. Interestingly, do you know when the bulk of these forces were moved to the border? 1940. Yep. A year earlier when the Germans had their back to the Soviets. If Stalin was planning an attack, that's when he would have gone. Yet he didn't. His troops just sat around twiddling their thumbs. But a year later, when Germany is much stronger, Stalin is planning to attack? Really?

An attack from the Red Army in 1941 would have gone about as well as their attempts at defense. They were undersupplied, poorly organised, poorly lead, poorly deployed and in many cases using obsolete equipment. Seriously, just look at how badly they performed during Barbarossa. It wasn't just a matter of the Germans launching a sneak attack (though certainly, that didn't help), the Red Army was simply not in any state to fight a major war in the summer of 1941. So why would Stalin prepare for an attack then given that he didn't even believe that there was an immediate threat of a German invasion that would require a preemptive attack?



German tanks had problems directly engaging the best Soviet models in '41. I said as much in my last post. But there's far more to tank usage than straight up battles against enemy tanks. And the Mark 4 Panzer was a very good machine when it came to all round fighting capability. It was reliable easily produced, reasonably well armed (anything armoured short of a T-34 was easily dealt with, and it had good HE capabilities) and had excellent "ergonomics" (for lack of a better term) - unlike the T-34 - allowing its crew to take full advantage of the tank's capabilities. The early models of T-34 were better, but the Mk. 4 certainly wasn't light years behind the Soviets' vehicles in '41. The real issue with the Mk. 4 was the lack of weapon upgrade potential due to its small turret ring. Had they been able to get a long 75mm gun in there, it would've been a fantastic vehicle.

And both the Tiger and Panther were steaming piles of crap. What the German's needed was a direct successor to the Mark 4, an easily produced versatile vehicle albeit with the capability to carry a larger main gun than its predecessors (the earlier designs of what would become the Panther - a ~35t vehicle with armour comparable to the T-34 - would've been good). What they built were overengineered vanity projects that look good when you line them up one-on-one with Allied tank models but are crap when it comes to actually winning wars. Their later tank destroyers and assault guns were for the most part good, but German tank design after the Mark 4 Panzer was a waste of time.

I'm not sure what your numbers there have to do with the supply situation. Soviet forces along the border were short on ammunition, equipment, spares etc. That's what you're missing. Simply having lots of troops there doesn't mean that those troops are in any state to actually launch an attack.

And a surprise attack is not nearly enough to explain the poor performance of the Red Army. It contributed certainly, but if the troops were actually battle ready (as they would be if they were, you know, preparing to attack....) they wouldn't have suffered a disaster on the level they did historically. I'm not saying they would've held at the border or such, but the Red Army's poor performance was down to them not being prepared for combat full stop.

Oh, and it's quite interesting that you bring up Stalin not wanting his men to fight back. Surely, if he was about to invade Germany, his reaction to news of German aggression would've been the complete opposite. In fact, it's almost as if he was trying to avoid war....

 

While Soviet doctrine did favour the offense all things being equal, hence some distinctly ill-advised counter attacks such as you describe, the idea that their troops hadn't trained to defend at all is utterly laughable. Hell, their plan in the event of invasion was a counteroffensive only after successfully repelling attacks. Even had they invaded Germany, there would still be significant amount of counter attacks for which their soldiers were trained. Not to mention, the Soviets had significant amounts of and were constructing more static defenses (some of which performed very well during Barbarossa). Why bother if they weren't going to defend?



Soviet maps were pretty bloody awful across the board - their German ones were really no better than their ones of their own territory.



They had some good stuff. They also had some utter crap, such most of their tanks and aircraft. Thing is, most of the latter was in the process of being replaced with excellent, modern equipment. A process that would've left them much stronger in '42-'43.

But there is more to it than just the equipment of the front line troops. On the logistical, command, communications, planning aspects, the Soviets were horribly backwards (and yes, in some case, so were the Germans). The 1941 mobilisation plans were a mess with massive shortages of transport and equipment (indeed, on a local level, many of said plans were simply left unfinished). You're apparently a couple of months short of the largest war you've ever fought and you don't even have the slightest clue how you're going to mobilise much of your forces?



Where from? They had shortages all over the place. Their logistics were a mess. The Red Army was simply in no state for large scale offensive operations in 1941.



Why did he have to move fast? Why not wait until he is in a stronger position? Time is on his side. Especially as he doesn't believe Hitler will attack him.


As an aside, I get the feeling we're rather going round in circles here. You're clearly a disciple of Suvurov's ideas, I'm most definitely not, and though I hate to say it, I doubt we're going to convince each other to change out minds....

WW2 was my favorite era for awhile... but recently it's been deep pre-history (like before Egypt, Greece, etc) so like whatever we seem to know about 40000 BC and all that.

Basically it's awesome because people know so little and yet it's clear there were stories to tell.

I think Jainism's origins were super ancient for instance, India isn't all Hinduism and Bhuddism, it turns out.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jainism#Main_Teachings

I'm also fascinated by the notion of giants becoming commonplace, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giant_(mythology)

There's also the history of England and Ireland, which I think was exceedingly complex and unique... I don't know if anyone's really pinned down the history well until the Norman era when it started homogenizing, but perhaps all the way up until that point there were many different groups vying with each other, it seems. 

www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/features/mythsofbritishancestry

Again, we are going in circles. Stalin would've probably preferred to wait till 42-43, but he was forced to plan and attack ASAP, because the German's were winning land and resources and could start efficiently using those resources (factories) There were rumors that Britain may fold and Churchill was quite openly suggesting it (even though he made a speech in 1940 that he would never do it) Britain was starving and out of resources to produce weapons and ammo.

Hitler could perform a successful operation using mainly horses to tow artillery, with light tanks and WWI weapons as the main armament, Stalin could do even better and guess what - Europe would've welcomed him as a liberator and probably without fighting.

If Stalin went to Romania as planned and destroyed Germany's only supply of fuel (and Italy was dependent on Germany to get to the Romanian oil) there would be no large scale counter offensives from the German side. They could not use tanks or planes or trucks to move. They would be sitting ducks. The main experienced forces would be destroyed on the border (just like USSR forces were destroyed) and German's would be at full retreat, organized or not.

Hitler had massive shortages of tank parts, ammo, planes and man power a few months into the war, even though he had massive amounts of Soviet supplies as trophies. Read Guderian's diary. Read Hoth's diary. They were desperate. Even after Polish conquest their tanks needed to be recalled to factories for complete maintenance. And Russia had crappy road network plus Germany could't use their railroad network because the rail tracks were too wide.

In a conversation with Guderian in July 1941, knowing that his field armies were wrestling with vast Soviet tank forces, Hitler remarked that he would not have attacked the Soviet Union had he believed Guderian's earlier estimate of 10,000 Soviet tanks in the late 1930s. The remark shows that Hitler had underestimated the number of Soviet tanks and leads to an interpretation of the campaign in which the masses of Soviet tanks had slowed, then stopped, the Germans, The Germans were surprised by the appearance of extremely high quality T-34 A and В and KV-I and 2 tanks in and among the more numerous lighter vehicles.{19} The conventional wisdom gathers impressive support in the thesis that the Germans were halted by the numbers and quality of the Red Army, particularly its tanks. In short, the masses of moderate-quality lighter vehicles slowed the Germans, while enough of the superior quality T-34s halted the Germans short of Moscow by December 1941.

In the initial hours after the German attack began, Stalin hesitated, wanting to ensure that the German attack was sanctioned by Hitler, rather than the unauthorized action of a rogue general. Those key moments allowed the Germans to have complete control and advantage on both ground and air.

Stalin wasn't completely ready. Hitler wasn't ready at all by comparison.

Also during Nuremberg trials many German generals and commanders (Keitel, Jodl) stated that it was indeed a preemptive attack on the Reich's side. Sure they are nazis and could be lying to shift the blame, but it's hard to believe they would all come up with such a lie at the same time in a moments notice.

Heh, PDox games are always at their best when they utterly break

I have to admit, i don't really have a favourite period of history. I used to focus a lot on much the same time period as you, but over the last couple of years I've been reading about all sorts of different bits of history (a rather scattergun approach of picking up books people have recommended), and most of it is just as fascinating.

HoI4 is the first Paradox game I've ever played (I've since bought and played Stellaris, but so far I do prefer HoI4), but I do very much want to get into Europa Universalis and Crusader Kings. More CK than EU, since I'm more interested in the proposed period of time for CK.

Well, I'll make this my last one.

There might have been rumors, but Britain in '41 was no where near close to surrendering. They still had huge reserves of unexploited resources and manpower (i.e. the Empire), and they had turned the tide in the battle of the Atlantic (latter U boat successes were mainly due to the Americans completely ignoring everything the Brits had learned about ASW). Meanwhile the Germans were the ones who's economy was creaking. Even with the looted territories, they were in a bad state - in fact, they were utterly dependent on the Soviet Union. A situation Stalin was happy with - the Germans wouldn't go to war as they couldn't afford to lose the resources they were getting from him. Of course, Hitler saw it the other way - the best way to deal with the situation was to take the resources, destroy his ideological enemy and gain vast amounts of soon to be empty land for the German people.

Stalin didn't need to attack because he believed he had bought peace. He was wrong of course, but people make mistakes. That''s really what this comes down to. Stalin fucked up big time.



The Germans spent a lot of time and effort getting what they needed to undertake such an invasion.

But the Soviet army wasn't prepared to launch an attack in that way. Could they have been in a position to do so? Probably. If a decision had been made in, say, mid '40 that there would be an all out attack on Germany in '41, then they could've assembled what the needed to push such an attack even with the issues they had. But they didn't. Instead, they were focusing on modernising and reorganising. No decision on invasion had been made at that time (indeed, the main 1940 war plan was a defensive one with counterattacks into German territory should the SU be attacked) and as such the Red Army as it was in mid '41 was in no position to launch a large scale offensive. Discussions of more aggressive war plans did take place in 1941 but there was no established strategy or a proposed date of operations, and actually implementing these would've not been possible in the timescale you propose. Some more limited pre-emptive strikes (focused on German forces close to the border rather than a full scale invasion) were also looked at (Zhukov proposed one such move in May '41), but were rejected partly because Stalin believed it unnecessary, but also because the Red Army simply couldn't mount a sufficiently large offensive given the preparations that had been made.



If the Soviets could secure Romania, yes, this would case massive damage to Germany's ability to fight. But the question is whether or not they could. And I've seen no evidence that convinces me that they were capable of it in 1941.



I don't really disagree with any of this, though I wouldn't put the focus particularly on the tanks in '41. They had an impact, but the sheer size of both the Red Army and the Soviet Union would've been enough to halt the Germans even without tanks. The impact of Soviet armoured forces was greater in the later years of the war.



Which again comes back to Stalin not expecting war at all. He believed he had peace. He had no reason to launch an attack in 1941.



Hitler was ready for the war he believed he was fighting. He was wrong.

Stalin wasn't ready for war believing he had peace. He too was wrong.



Well, Nazi propaganda had been claiming the war was a pre-emptive strike since the word go, and on top of that, they were facing the death penalty for launching a war of aggression so I'm gonna take anything they say with a massive pinch of salt. Though if we are going to take Nazi commanders at face value, you should look at people like Halder who, as late as June 1941 described the Soviet deployments as defensive in nature and was highly skeptical of any Soviet ability to threaten the oilfields of Romania.